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Abstract  
In the recent years the term Big Data has been vividly discussed in management, the IS community 
and in the IT departments. Due to its potential for corporate performance and competitive advantage 
it has gained large attention up into the C-level-management. Observations on the possible negative 
consequences of living in a data-driven world have mostly been limited to the perspective of an 
individual. For instance, concerns about data privacy have been vividly discussed when the growing 
hunger of governmental or private institutions for ever more and more personalized data was made 
public. This article starts with a critical reflection on the phenomena of Big Data, focusing on the 
consequences for organizations and decision making. Next a case from the field of risk management is 
investigated in more detail using behavioural economics. Upon a series of experiments this paper 
sheds light on the possibility to create emotional markets using Big Data analytics in an un-reflected 
way. As a key takeaway this article should raise the awareness of behavioural risk. The presented 
work suggests extending the organizational risk framework by addressing behavioural risk. 
Keywords: Big Data, Actuary, behavioural economics, risk management. 
1 Introduction  
“Chance favours the prepared mind.” – Louis Pasteur (1822 – 1895)  
Lately the term Big Data has been vividly discussed. In order to gain competitive advantage in a 
volatile business environment, large organizations increasingly face the need to maintain and analyze 
large amounts of structured and unstructured data (Davenport and Harris, 2007; Laney, 2001). The 
sources of these data can lie inside or outside the organizational borders and they need to access the 
data be of an ad-hoc or a dispositive characteristic. Due to its potential for corporate performance and 
competitive advantage it has gained large attention up into the C-level-management. Observations on 
the possible negative consequences of living in a data-driven world have mostly been limited to the 
perspective of an individual. For instance, concerns about data privacy have been vividly discussed 
when the growing hunger of governmental (e.g. the NSA) or private (e.g. Google or Apple) 
institutions for ever more and more personalized data was made public. The overall impact on 
organizations and the risk they impose themselves to if they rely of data only, has not been reflected in 
detail.    
Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a prominent topic in the insurance industry where it has 
concentrated on such tangible risks as mortality, reserving, financial, catastrophe and operational risk. 
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There exists a long history of Information Systems (IS) to support managing such tangible risks – e.g. 
models, algorithms and specialized software. In addition, banks and insurers, particularly life insurers, 
have increasingly considered the behavioural traits of their policyholders (Murray-Webster, 2007). In 
order to support that task, supporting IS had to move from isolated operations research models to 
sophisticated integrative capabilities such as for instance network analysis, sentiment analysis. That 
development was basically backed up by the technical development that is commonly summarized 
under the term ‘Big Data Analytics’ and the increasing availability of data on policyholders. This data 
of enterprises and individuals can be accessed relatively easy e.g. by retaining data from social media 
or buying stocks of data from loyalty programs.  
After a short introduction of the phenomena summarized by the term Big Data, this article will focus 
on the consequences for organizations. Build upon a series of experiments grounded in behavioural 
economics; we intend to shed light on the possibility to create emotional markets using Big Data 
analytics. As a key takeaway this article should raise the awareness of behavioural risk. We suggest 
extending the organizational risk framework by addressing such scenarios. While the promise of a 
broader data base sounds very valuable for risk managers, this article will argue that a) rely on Big 
Data Analytics has pitfalls that make the risk analysis even less reliable, b) insurers should pay 
particular attention to the actions of their own risk stakeholders and c) discuss the potential future role 
of actuaries in that matter.  
2 Background 
2.1 Big data, Big impact, big confusion  
Neither the trend towards ever more data integration nor the promise of finding value in the amounts 
of accessible data is exactly new. Yet, recent developments in social behaviour (i.e. people become 
reluctant to provide and share personal behaviour on social media sites), technological pervasion (e.g. 
increasing amounts of sensor data becoming available) and the capability to store and analyze these 
data (enabled mostly by innovation in database technologies e.g. in parallel data storage and 
processing) lead to the emergence of a new phenomenon that goes beyond the capability of standard 
analytical software and is commonly summarized by the term ‘Big Data’.  
As catchy is this might sound, these and similar introductions to the field of Big Data make the term so 
difficult to work with. First, when taken the term literally one is looking at a constantly moving target; 
since the 1980s the planet’s technological capability to store electronic data per-capita doubles 
approximately every 40 months (Hilbert and López, 2011). When the Sloan Digital Sky Survey 
(SDSS) started to store astronomical data in the year 2000, it took a few weeks of operation until it 
gathered more (raw) data than the data collected in the previous history of astronomy combined. 
Storing roughly 200 GB per night, SDSS has by now build-up more than 140 terabytes of data. When 
the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST), successor to SDSS stationed in Chile, starts to operate 
in 2016 it is expected to obtain the same sum of data in a few days (Casey and Perez, 2012). Computer 
scientist Jim Gray, who was involved in the SDSS working on the “SkyServer” proclaimed the 
beginning of the age of “data science” in the late 1990s (Hey, Tansley and Tolle, 2009) well beyond 
the natural sciences. Soon after, the Business Intelligence field moved from analysis of historical data 
collected in data warehouses to quasi real-time analysis of high-frequency trading in finance added the 
data stream aspect to data mining. Today, search engines, web commerce, and social media have 
added text mining, social network analysis, and heterogeneous data analysis to the spectrum that is 
called Big Data. Particular due to the recent improvements in database technology and the ability to 
process and visualize large amounts of streaming data, potentially enables organizations to realize 
business cases that would not have been possible or feasibility in the past. E.g. decoding the 3 billion 
base pairs of the human genome originally took around 10 years (Collins, Lander, Rogers and 
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Waterston, 2004). Given the today’s technology it can be achieved in less than a week (Sboner, Mu, 
Greenbaum, Auerbach and Gerstein, 2011). Since the previously stated ‘commonly used software 
tools’ also catch up quickly in processing ever more data. There also might be something like 
‘perceived’ or ‘relative’ Big Data since the view of a data set as being big might vary in different user 
groups – let’s say from the amount of data processed within the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid 
(WLCG) at the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN, 2013) to the data needed to the 
data needed in a factory to demand the optimum of supply to stock in the next quarter.  
Second, and even though Big Data is about to peak the Gartner hype-cycle (Lapkin, 2012), Big Data is 
likely to be not of immediate appearance or current fashion. It can be considered as a logical 
development building on technological advances (mostly in database technology and visualization) 
and a large base of knowledge grounded in various fields such as Operations Research (Churchman, 
Ackoff and Arnoff, 1957; Gass and Assad, 2005; Kirby, 2003), Management Science – particular the 
decision-making process (Simon, 1976) and (Management-) Information Systems (Inmon, 1996; 
March and Hevner, 2007; Shim, Warkentin, Courtney, Power, Sharda and Carlsson, 2002; Turban and 
Walls, 1995). Particular the field of Business Intelligence (Dresner, Buytendijk, Linden, Friedman, 
Strange, Knox and Camm, 2002; Luhn, 1958) made it possible to structure the underlying strategies 
and concepts regarding the integration of large data sets in order to prepare them for analysis and 
visualization (Moss and Atre, 2003; Turban, Sharda, Delen and Aronson, 2011; Watson, 2010; Wixom 
and Watson, 2001). Google’s director of research, Peter Norvig, puts it this way: “We don’t have 
better algorithms. We just have more data” (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012). Epistemologically 
speaking, this might be relevant for IS theory. Since data and information are currently distinguished 
by context in the standard textbooks (e.g. Krcmar, 2010). Combining enough raw data, suitable 
models, advances algorithms (partly self-learning) and powerful computers Big Data Analysis can 
reveal new insights that would in the past have remained unseen. As a consequence, data and 
information are increasingly tricky to tell apart.  
Last, the term would probably not have reached so much attention among non-specialists, or given as 
‘natural’ consequence of continuous technological integration, if it was not for a certain media 
attention; particular concerning the issue of data privacy. Providing spatial and statistical data the 
perception was initially received positive. Particular as a consequence of the financial crisis, 
authorities enforced a set of regulations demanding ever more data to be provided to the authorities. 
Recent court cases in the USA have also lead organizations to keep large masses of documents, E-
Mails and other forms of electronic communication that may be required in case they face litigation. 
Recently the issue has become increasingly controversial as governmental efforts to collect an 
increasing amount of (private) data (e.g. Bamford, 2012; NSA, 2011) was made public. Hence, 
researchers and media have been increasingly busy pointing out the negative consequences Big Data 
has on the individual – e.g. the impact on data privacy (Wigan and Clarke, 2013).   
Yet, the practical challenges of Big Data do not stop at the individual level. The most obvious threat is 
that Big Data projects fail because of the same reasons as previous attempts to establish analytics in an 
organization did (Baars, Felden, Gluchowski, Hilbert, Kemper and Olbrich, 2014). Particular the 
Business Intelligence (BI) literature offers a huge amount of knowledge on reasons for failure and 
critical success factors and should be respected (Chenoweth, Corral and Demirkan, 2006; Hwang and 
Hongjiang, 2005; Joshi and Curtis, 1999; Olbrich, Niehaves and Pöppelbuß, 2011; Yeoh and 
Koronios, 2010). In principle the established success models seem be adaptable to Big Data as well 
(DeLone and McLean, 2003; Wixom and Watson, 2001). However their might be particularities to Big 
Data that are unique, as some known success factors might be bound to new moderators or must be re-
investigated. Take the success factor of adequately skilled labour for example. One might argue that 
the quality of that influence factor changes drastically since truly data-driven organizations will need a 
lot more analytical staff, the service approach reaches its limit with Big Data and analysts must now 
truly engage business and the harm of feeding analytical models with incorrect assumptions is far 
higher and for instance running standard reports (Davenport and Patil, 2012). It will be interesting to 
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see if a new class of analysts emerge or exiting field of skilled analysts like actuaries will take the lead 
(Jobanputra, 2013). 
The mainstream critique on such a data-driven approach usually questions to what degree the 
statistical results can be trusted or not - "A crucial problem is that we do not know much about the 
underlying empirical micro-processes that lead to the emergence of the typical network characteristics 
of Big Data" (Snijders, Matzat and Reips, 2012). In other disciplines like medicine and bioscience, the 
standard scientific approaches are grounded on experiments. Hence, the limiting factor for a successful 
experiment is the significant data that can confirm or disprove the preliminary hypothesis. The 
information collected from ‘big’ data without prior premise is complementary to the experimentation 
approach and occasionally essential to support conventional approaches (Jones, Schildhauer, 
Reichman and Bowers, 2006). Consequently, the challenge in such a data-driven process is the ex-post 
articulation of a sound hypothesis to explain the data (Hey et al., 2009). If the search logic is reversed 
– as it is by Big Data Analytics - the limits of induction have to to be considered (see "Glory of 
Science and Philosophy scandal" (Broad, 1914)). 
While some consider the lack of ex-ante hypothesis as being the “end of Science” or at least “end of 
theory” (Anderson, 2008), others point out the social-technical dimension of the Big Data 
phenomenon and the opportunities for researchers since it has to be framed constantly in its social and 
organizational context. Since organizations spend substantial sums to derive insight from Big Data on 
their supplier networks or customers behaviour, little of the current workforce has sufficiently mature 
skills to do so and little to no organizations support processes to absorb these information (Redman, 
2008). Yet, independent of how comprehensive or widespread the statistics, Big Data Analytics needs 
to be flanked by a ‘big level of judgment’ (Shah, Horne and Capellá, 2012). 
Highlighting that the actions that are supported by or derived from Big Data are inevitably "informed 
by the world as it was in the past, or, at best, as it currently is", Hilbert (2013) questions the ability of 
prediction at all. Certainly, sophisticated algorithms can predict future development but only on the 
pre-conditions that they can work on the basis of a large volume of historic data on comparable 
experiences and that the future developments are similar to the ones in the past. Past occurrences will 
have little effect on predictions about the future however, if the systems dynamics change. 
Understanding of the systems dynamic requires sound theory respecting boundary conditions. The 
most promising combining approach currently is agent-based models that are used in natural (mostly 
Biology), technological (e.g. Sensor Networks) and Social Science (e.g. in Agent-Base Simulations). 
In practice the question remains on who will feed these models. Particular when models are generated 
without underlying theory or strong assumptions are made (e.g. concerning risk avoiding strategies or 
disaster planning) the modelling task itself becomes a behavioural risk.  
2.2 Behavioural Economics and Enterprise Risk Management 
Early foundations of Behavioural Economics reach back until Adam Smith’s “The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments” (1759) and Jeremy Bentham’s thoughts on usefulness (Bentham, 1952; Bentham, 1995). 
If was however only later picked up, when more and more scientists gave up strict neoclassical 
economic positions. Since then, Behavioural Economics are commonly used when the model 
assumptions of a rational acting ‘Homo Oeconomicus’ fail. It therefore can be described as the study 
on the role of cognitive or social effects, and emotional factors when individuals or organizations face 
economic decisions (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2001). Obviously the findings of psychology have had 
a big impact in this a sub-discipline of economic theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Rabin, 1998). 
There exist a few subfields that investigate particular aspects such as behavioural finance that 
highlight inefficiencies in the financial markets. Interestingly enough from an IS-perspective, the 
purpose is to frame causes of market trends to irrational reactions to information; in severe cases of 
market-bubbles such as the dotcom one in 2001 and crashes like the recent financial crises.  
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Theories of Behavioural Economics are mostly proven by small scenario experiments or answers to 
specifically designed lab questions. This approach should enable the researchers to limit the possible 
numbers of explanations; which is particular important since the subject of the investigation is already 
an anomaly that cannot be explained by mainstream economics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). That being said, it should be mentioned that the field of behavioural 
finance mostly uses market data – not seldom real market transactions – to perform experiments 
(Shleifer, 1999). 
Theories that are developed in Behavioural Economics usually belong to one of the following streams:  
I. Heuristics to not base ones decisions upon a sophisticated model or evaluating all possible 
outcomes but rather follow a quick and simple ‘rule of thumb’ approach that can be based in 
previous experiences or simple a gut feeling (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991).  
II. Framing refers to the context in which a particular decision or choice is made. It is investigated 
to what degree the circumstances leaves the organization or the individual biased during the 
decision process (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). 
III. Market inefficiencies also include actors that’s behaviour seems irrational or at least contradicts 
common expectations, like obvious mistakes in pricing, non-rational decisions, etc. (Thaler, 
1994). This is usually explained using Prospect Theory, which is a generalization of the 
classical utility approach, that allows for the biases that people exhibit when faced with 
uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
It has been more than 30 years now that the leading researchers in this field – like the psychologists 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman who published their leading articles on heuristics, biases and 
prospect theory (Only the latter received the Noble Prize for their joint work in Economic Science in 
2002, since it is not awarded posthumously). Since then Behavioural Economics have become 
common currency in research and practice. For instance, the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) 
first occasional paper was entirely devoted to the subject (Erta, Hunt, Iscenko and Brambley, 2013). 
The FCA defines behavioural economics as an area that “uses insights from psychology to explain why 
people behave the way they do. People do not always make choices in a rational and calculated way. 
In fact, most human decision-making uses thought processes that are intuitive and automatic rather 
than deliberative and controlled.” In our view, chief risk officers (CROs) and others involved in ERM 
have much to gain from an understanding of behavioural economics. One of the important roles of 
ERM is to help firms to make appropriate decisions when facing risk and uncertainty. It is essential for 
a CRO to understand the common flaws in decision-making, to help individuals to overcome them, 
and to understand the implications for the firm’s risk management framework. Or as the author and 
capital manager Luca Celati (2004) puts it „Human emotions, biases and frames surrounding 
problems and information play a critical and poorly understood role in risk and top management 
decisions“. Yet, state-of the-art risk management IS do currently not support that task in the modelling 
process.  
3 Research Approach  
In his recent book Daniel Kahneman has summarized the joint work in this field over the last decades: 
Kahneman (2011) introduces two mental systems, that we use judging the world around us. The fast 
system is mainly unconscious and makes immediate decisions based on heuristics – e.g. past 
experiences of similar events, stories and emotions. According to Kahneman we are as likely to be 
wrong as right using the fast system since we are easily swayed by our emotions (see I). The process 
by which we consciously check the facts and think carefully and rationally about a given choice makes 
the second system painfully slow. Because of the careful framing (see II), the slow system is easily 
distracted and hard to engage. We consider this to be a connection to Business Intelligence literature 
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which identified similar obstacles when introducing Information Systems with dispositive character 
(Hwang and Hongjiang, 2005; Sandler, 2010; Zimmer, Baars and Kemper, 2012) and the claim for 
more agile decision support (Conboy, 2009; Knabke and Olbrich, 2013; Rouse, 2007). The two 
systems work together, shaping our impressions of the world and help us to make choices. It also 
developed a terminology that individuals and organizations can use to acknowledge and reflect these 
biases and also prepare for individuals or organizations seem to make irrational choices (see III). We 
base our experiments with actuarial software on that though, conducting experiments in all of the 
streams and using the concept of the two mental systems.  
Kahnemann (2011) further provided a selection of previous experiments and observations on the 
various biases to which we are subject when facing uncertainty and risk. For instance he refers to the 
fact that professional golfers are putting – independent from the distance to the hole - more precise 
when aiming for par than when they are for birdie. Another example is that individuals buy way more 
cans of soup when there's a sign indicating a limitation like ‘Limit 12 per customer’. Yet, the 
anecdotes and theses seem rather simple; particular given certain maturity in the mature field of risk 
management and today’s media competency. Given the reliance on professional risk managers and the 
increased grounding of decisions in (big) data, we want to find out if the theses still hold true and the 
stream of Behavioural Economics also apply to experts in statistics, decision making and risk 
assessment. Therefore we conduct experiments on practising actuaries and actuary consultants in order 
to answer the following questions: 
• Do trained experts (like actuaries) use better heuristics?  
• Does framing and bias has the same effect on (professional) decision makers?  
• To what degree is market inefficiency considered by analytical experts?  
The actuaries we conducted the experiments on are employed at a private company that is among the 
most successful firms that offer actuarial consulting services and software solutions for actuaries. The 
company has earned this brand name by offering a holistic serve portfolio reaching from pension 
benefit plan valuations to financial services related to insurance and risk assessment and mitigation. 
Considering the importance of computer-aided statistical skills and knowledge about (software) 
modelling in today’s actuarial science, this firm can be appreciated significantly for being one of the 
major suppliers on the market. We asked 115 employed actuaries in the London office to join the 
experiments. The selection was made based on the work experience (more than three years) and 
experience in risk assessment (more than one year). Depending on the individual experiment between 
33% and 47% participated. Later we introduce a risk management framework that was established at 
one of Europe’s major (re-) insurance companies. Still, under the impression of recent turbulences that 
financial markets and newly introduced regulations by national legislature and the European 
authorities, the reinsurer contracted a team of actuaries respectively revise their current risk 
management framework.  
4 Preview to expected results  
To address the streams I-III of behavioural economics (see section 2.2) we conducted a set of 
experiments that deal with rational decision making, biases and framing. In this research in progress 
paper we take the example of anchor bias as it is one of the best-known findings of experimental 
psychology. Anchor bias occurs for instance when individuals are asked to guess an unknown 
quantity. If before estimation the individuals are presented with a particular value for that quantity 
then their estimates inevitably stay closer to that prior value than would otherwise have been the case.  
In a merely ERM context, anchor bias is frequently exhibited by insurers in their choice of parameters 
when building models. This bias is often even encouraged by regulators and auditors expecting firms 
to lie close to some market benchmark or standard regulatory formula. Anchoring can also apply in a 
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qualitative sense as insurers can be anchored in their model design to market-standard approaches or 
to models developed for altered purpose. Anchor bias can also be important for finance and actuarial 
teams in insurers when setting reserves for new lines of business; particularly where they are long-
tailed. In this case it is often the business plan of the new underwriting team which can unwittingly act 
as an anchor; for instance the business plan that may have formed part of an acquisition or interview 
process in some cases. Commonly, the standard implemented actuary software uses the standard 
Bornhuetter-Ferguson (1972) reserving technique that mathematically incorporates such results as an 
anchor on the real results for many years if the business plan is used to set prior loss ratios. 
In order to illustrate the problem of anchor bias incorporated in the modellers and therefore the 
software models, we framed the question in two parts: for example we asked the participating 
actuaries the following two questions: 
• Was the ‘The Treaty of Utrecht’ singed before or after the year 1800?  
• What is your best educated guess of when the ‘The Treaty of Utrecht’ was signed? 
Independent of the correct answer (1713), this typically produces answers to the second question 
significantly later in average than a group asked the same questions but with the 1800 anchor changed 
to 1500. In our case almost 300 years later to in average 274 years (n=52). Astonishingly, the same 
bias is produced even when the individuals ‘know’ (or would if they were acting and thinking 
rationally) that the anchor in the first question cannot have any influence on the second question (such 
as when they generate the last three digits of the first number themselves, for example from their own 
telephone number). In a purely ERM context, anchor bias is often exhibited by insurers in their choice 
of parameters when building internal models. This bias is often encouraged by some of the main 
‘hurdles’ in the insurance sector – regulators and auditors – expecting firms to lie close to some 
market benchmark or standard regulatory formula. Anchoring can also apply in a qualitative sense: 
insurers can be anchored in their model design to market-standard approaches or to models developed 
for a different purpose. First indications point to the fact that trained experts, in our case actuaries, fall 
for exactly the same biases in the experiments. In a world of big data and an increasing demand for 
statistical knowledge and application, we suggest expanding the ERM frameworks and address that 
issue (see Figure 1).  
Risk culture is at the heart of an enterprise risk framework and we have seen great value in firms 
commissioning an external risk culture in the organization. Yet, as we have discussed above, even 
insurance risk professionals may demonstrate various biases in their daily work. One starting point to 
counter this problem is to include a behavioural assessment in such a risk culture. Another is to 
introduce software features that support an expert judgement policy and accompanying documentation 
process. For instance, when developing a capital model one of the most important and often neglected 
risks is model risk. Model risk can be considered a meta-risk due to largely qualitative factors, for 
example: re-using an inappropriate old software model; misinterpreting results; or failing to 
communicate the results of the model effectively. Insurers that are most advanced in capital modelling 
do understand and mitigate model risk alongside other risks.   
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Figure 1. Development of risk management 
5 Tentative Conclusion, limitations and outlook  
There exist prominent critique of the experimental approach and the behavioural economics altogether 
(e.g Farma, 2012). The common argument is that market economies work perfectly fine and behave 
rational. Hence, behavioural economics investigate nothing more than anomalies in the markets that 
will sooner or later be equilibrated or are even might be priced already (Myagkov and Plott, 1997). As 
elaborated in the section on the general critique on Big Data, there is an undeniable trend towards Big 
Data analysis. Just by the size of the trend we argue that this is more than investigating anomalies but 
has the potential to create self-fulfilling movements in the market by relying on the analysis on 
potential anomalies. Concerning the approach in experiments questions about real world data and lack 
of incentive compatibility are raised. In order to address the first issue, we conducted our experiments 
among practicing experts in the field of risk assessment and bring in their experience. The latter 
critique cannot be addressed by our sample. However, there is a brought literature that proofs the value 
of experiments as they could be soundly repeated in different environments and countries; hence, there 
is a viable empirical foundation of theoretical models (Rabin, 1998).  
Our results offer rich opportunity for future investigation. Obviously, Big Data does not uniquely 
deserve a critical view. Including behavioural aspects in the analysis process and probably even in the 
underlying models, valuable information can be retrieved and guide organizations towards competitive 
advantage. As the attention of the topic proves, decision makers are certainly aware of that potential 
(Lapkin, 2012). However, except a new use cases (e.g. in fraud detection or individual marketing), the 
full potential of Big Data Analytics is still today still not leveraged in most organizations and many 
still hesitate to invest. To date, there is not enough literature or competence out there to make a solid 
case in the eyes of senior management. It will be interesting to observe whether the profession of 
Actuaries might fill that gap and take a leading role in the Big Data movement (Jobanputra, 2013). 
Second, we addressed the need of extending organizations risk assessment framework by behavioural 
risk. The extension we suggested is still on a high level and was applied in one insurance company and 
their customized actuarial software. Further investigation should be done that implements the 
framework in different companies and other branches of industry. We intend to review how the 
framework works with the reinsurer on a regular basis and we are happy to report on it. 
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